I argue (1) that what (ontic) New Mechanistic philosophers of science call mechanisms would be material Gestalten, and (2) that Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Gestalt theory can help us frame a standing challenge against ontic conceptions of mechanisms. In short, until the (ontic) New Mechanist can provide us with a plausible account of the organization of mechanisms as an objective feature of mind-independent ontic structures in the world which we might discover-and no ontic Mechanist has done so-it is more conservative to claim that mechanistic organization is instead a mind-dependent aspect of our epistemic strategies of mechanistic explanation.
Introduction
In early work, New Mechanistic philosophers of biology seemed to promote what Salmon (1984a) called an ontic view of explanation. In an ontic view (roughly), the explanation of a phenomenon is, most fundamentally, the mind-independent ontic structure(s) in the world that causes, constitutes, or is otherwise responsible for the occurrence of the phenomenon. Ontic Mechanists hold that mechanisms are such structures. This view has been further articulated and promoted by Craver (2007 Craver ( , 2014 ). An alternative is what Salmon called an epistemic view, in which (roughly) explanations are, most fundamentally, mind-dependent strategies of making phenomena intelligible, predictable, or understandable. According to robust epistemic views, "mechanisms" are mere posits, theoretically constructed as part of such a strategy (cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bechtel 2015) .
Here I invoke the history of philosophy to articulate what is today a novel challenge to ontic Mechanists. First (Sect. 2) I argue that the ontic Mechanists' ontological commitment to mechanisms is equivalent to the Gestaltists' commitment to what they called "physical Gestalten"-what I call "material Gestalten" (Köhler 1920; Koffka 1936) . I show that Mechanists endorse a form of holism regarding mechanisms' organization and constitution. Just such holism, I argue, is what the Berlin Gestaltists 1 highlighted when distinguishing material Gestalten from mere "and-summations." Mechanisms, if they exist in the world, are material Gestalten.
I then (Sect. 3) show that this ontological commitment has been poorly understood by Mechanists themselves. In short, there is consensus that constitutive relations within organized mechanisms (between parts and whole) should be understood non-causally, but no ontological analysis of mechanistic organization has attained consensus. This leads to a puzzle: how can ontic Mechanists justify ontological commitment to mechanistic organization, when leading accounts of Mechanistic explanation seem offer no specification of what it is, exactly, to which we are allegedly ontologically committed?
Finally (Sect. 4), I adapt Merleau-Ponty's argument against the Gestaltists to challenge the ontic Mechanists' understanding of our ontological commitment to material Gestalten. Merleau-Ponty's own argument involved claims which many authors today may not endorse, but I disentangle his core criticism. According to Merleau-Ponty's core criticism, we do not discover material Gestalten through scientific research, and conducting scientific research does not itself incur any ontological commitment to material Gestalten. Instead, (a) we assume in advance that some of the systems we study should be understood as organized wholes, and (b) that assumption is never discharged by some scientific demonstration that it holds true.
Merleau-Ponty helps us offer a diagnosis of why it has proven so difficult for the New Mechanists to provide any clear ontological account of mechanistic organization. The philosophical "problem" of analyzing mechanistic organization arises because leading accounts of Mechanistic explanation, despite their sophistication in other areas, do not say what mechanistic organization would be. Since the alleged ontological commitment to mechanistic organization is simply not spelled out in any detail in views of Mechanistic explanation, the problem has been understood as a demand to supplement accounts of Mechanistic explanation, retroactively shoehorning in clarification of the ontology of mechanistic organization. The diagnosis I offer is that this alleged ontological commitment has been problematically presupposed by the ontic Mechanist from the outset: that is part of the reason why (otherwise relatively complete) accounts have been able to proceed while saying little about it.
This Merleau-Pontian diagnosis helps frame a moderate position that evades the "problem" of analyzing the special ontology of mechanistic organization: we can simply abandon the ontological presupposition. Especially in the absence of any objective analysis of mechanistic organization, we may more moderately maintain that organization is simply a subjective feature of how we apprehend mechanistic phenomena: it is a mind-dependent feature of epistemic strategies of explanation, not a mind-independent feature of the world.
In short, the history of philosophy is put to work to frame a challenge against ontic Mechanists. As I shall clarify, while this challenge is similar to others (e.g., Bechtel 2015) , it is a novel contribution in the present debate.
Mechanisms are material Gestalten
In this section I argue that ontic mechanisms would be material Gestalten. Bringing this to light requires completing three tasks. First (Sect. 2.1) I review a common conception of Gestalten as only perceptual-phenomenal entities. Second (Sect. 2.2) I re-introduce the under-appreciated notion of material Gestalten, and clarify the role they were intended to play in Gestaltism. As I shall clarify, the Gestaltists endorsed two claims as definitive of all Gestalten:
Holistic Individuation (HI): There exist parts and/or properties that are individuated only when they occur in some whole (i.e., as dependent parts of some Gestalt). Holistic Explanation (HE): There exist wholes (i.e., Gestalten) whose parts exhibit behaviors or properties that are only explicable given properties of the whole. 2 The Gestaltists held that HI and HE characterized not only the organized whole-objects of perceptual experience, but also the organization of material structures. Relations between these different varieties of Gestalten were key to the Gestaltist's proposed model of psycho-physical explanation. I do not intend to promote the Gestaltist's own view of psycho-physical explanation, but discuss it in some detail to clarify the basic features of material Gestalten.
Finally I clarify foundational commitments regarding the organization of mechanisms, and I argue that (ontic) New Mechanists are likewise committed to HI (Sect. 2.3) and HE (Sect. 2.4): mechanisms are Gestalten.
Perceptual-phenomenal Gestalten
Today, "Gestalten" are typically understood as perceptual-phenomenal structures. 3 For example, Grush 4 provides the "illusory contours" figure below, then invokes a perceptual-phenomenal conception of Gestalten when he comments:
"…the explanation would appear to be that something about the stimulus conditions triggers the perceptual system to construct a representation other than the one that accurately reflects what is being presented… The various Gestalt criteria can be given explanations in these terms… What this suggests is that the content of perceptual experience is not a mere passive registration of external events, but involves some degree of active construction…" (Grush 2008, p. 150) .
We can make limited headway in understanding the original conception of Gestalten using this case. First, recall the Gestaltists' thesis of HI:
Holistic Individuation (HI): There exist parts and/or properties that are individuated only when they occur in some whole (i.e., as dependent parts of some Gestalt).
Here "individuation" is meant in a metaphysical sense, not a cognitive or epistemic sense (Lowe 2003) . Epistemically, we individuate objects by discerning them from others: for disambiguation, I call this "identification." Metaphysically, an object is individuated by what makes it the object it is, distinct in its being from others. In our perception of this illusory contours figure, there is an intuitive sense in which HI holds true. Viewing the figure, we tend to experience a white square, flanked at each corner by occluded black circles. Experiencing a square requires experiencing its (illusory) edges. What is perceptually "filled in" appears (fleetingly) as edges-of-asquare, not free-floating "lines." The individuation of the edges as edges-of -a-square requires their participation in a whole square, in accordance with HI. I take it that this application of HI is relatively straightforward.
HE is another matter:
Holistic Explanation (HE): There exist wholes (i.e., Gestalten) whose parts exhibit behaviors or properties that are only explicable given properties of the whole Applied here, HE means that experiencing apparent edges is in some sense explained by properties of one's whole experience when viewing this figure. Grush sketches the more common (non-holistic) approach to explaining the case: we explain the experience of edges by appeal to properties of the stimulus and of sub-personal processing. How might the Gestaltist invoke HE? As Chudnoff clarifies, the Gestaltists pursued a kind of phenomenological explanation, captured by the (cryptic) doctrine of the Law of Prägnanz (2013, p. 176) . 5 The Law of Prägnanz holds that perceptual experience tends to be as "good" (regular, symmetric, simplistic) as it can be, even if this requires that our experience be an inaccurate representation of stimuli. For the illusory contours figure, suppose an experience of a white square occluding four black circles is simpler than an experience of four un-occluded Pac-Man shapes oriented toward the center of the figure. If that were so, we could invoke the Law of Präg-nanz to provide a kind of explanation (an answer to a why-question). Why do we experience illusory edges? Because that is part of the simplest whole-experience we can have, faced with this stimulus. On this view, "a property of the whole [experience]-greater simplicity in organization-explains a property of the part" (Chudnoff 2013, p. 176) .
Material Gestalten
The foregoing is not the full account of the Gestaltists' explanation of this case, because a narrow, perceptual-phenomenal understanding of Gestalten does not fully capture the notion.
In his Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Koffka introduced Gestalt theory as a worldview that promised, among other things, (a) a new understanding of the nature of facts, theories, and science, (b) a comprehensive integration of quantity, order, and meaning (value) into a unified ontology, and (c) a novel resolution of the early 20th materialism-vitalism debate. 6 The notion of material Gestalten can be introduced in connection with this last issue. The Gestaltist aims to resolve the materialism-vitalism debate by showing that the kind of "order" which the vitalist claimed to uniquely characterize living systems is not unreal, not the result of some "vital force," but rather (in a basic form) already present in inanimate physical systems (Koffka 1936, p. 17) . This approach was pursued emphatically in Köhler's (1920) Physical Gestalten in Rest and Stationary State: the notion of Gestalten was extended to the material world itself, to characterize orderly systems at large. To illustrate this view, I sketch the Gestaltist's complete view of psycho-physical explanation.
Recognizing material (specifically, physical) Gestalten is construed as affirmatively answering the question "Are there physical whole-states or whole structures in which the parts are not mere and-summations [Undverbindungen]… of elementary individual states and individual structures?" (Köhler 1920, p. 25/42) . 7 We can clarify this question (and its answer) by clarifying the concept of an "and-summation": "An aggregate [Zusammen] of 'parts' or 'pieces' is a pure 'summation' [eine reine "Summe"] only when its constituents may be added together one after another without thereby causing any alteration in any of them; and conversely, a summation is that kind of aggregate from which any one or more units may be removed without any effect either on the ones remaining or on the ones removed" (ibid., p. 25/42).
Where a collection is an "and-summation," the properties of the whole are merely summative, and can be understood in terms of: the intrinsic properties of the first item, and the intrinsic properties of the second item, and the intrinsic properties of the 6 In that debate, the materialist was often a classical mechanist: these must be contrasted with the New Mechanists who are my interlocutors here. 7 Citations to Köhler usually provide (1) pagination from the only existing partial translation, due to Ellis (1967) , then (2) pagination from the first German edition. Ellis editorialized significantly, and I occasionally amend his translation. Occasionally I cite a passage omitted from Ellis' translation, and provide only German pagination. third… and so on. For example, the weight of a collection is equal to the weight of all the parts taken together. If all the collection's parts and properties work like this, it is a mere and-summation.
Gestalten, in contrast, exhibit interdependence: a kind of conditioning or determination of parts' properties occurs in virtue of their role in the whole. Köhler's flagship examples of physical Gestalten are electrostatic charges in circuits: cases chosen for their presumed applicability to neural systems. A simple case concerns a charged conductor. When charge is applied to an insulated conductor, the charge (1) distributes itself over the outer surface of the conductor, and (2) attains equilibrium. The specific distributions which count as equilibria are determined by physical properties of the conductor. In a charged conductor which is, as a whole, at equilibrium, "it is impossible to decrease, increase, or displace any part of this charge alone; for with any such change there occurs a reaction throughout the entire natural structure" (Köhler 1920, p. 28/56) . "In a word the structures of static charges upon conductors of given shape are physical Gestalten" (ibid., p. 28/58).
HI applies: the charge at any point p in a conductor c is only individuated (it only has the determinate properties it has) if the whole conductor is at equilibrium. 8 The determinate charge at any point p can only be varied by applying more or less charge to the whole conductor and allowing it to attain equilibrium again.
HE also applies: we can answer the question of why the charge at p is as it is by saying the whole conductor has attained equilibrium, given the applied charge. Explanation need not stop here, of course; we can proceed to explain how the conductor attains equilibrium in terms of physical properties of the conductor, movements of ions, etc. The availability of this decompositional explanation does not diminish or counteract the holistic explanation in terms of equilibria.
Köhler thought this model applied wholesale to the brain. Neurons were regarded as poorly-insulated conductors. When charged, a field of electrostatic forces would surround the neuron, forming a Gestalt. A number of such fields in interaction (e.g., in a region of the brain) would form a yet-larger whole-field: another, larger Gestalt. The whole brain would exhibit a field composed of myriad lesser Gestalten. 9 Köhler suggested further that a naturalistic explanation of any experience (e.g., the perceptual-phenomenal experience of seeing an illusory figure) would depend upon their being some region of the brain exhibiting a material Gestalt of electrostatic forces whose structure was isomorphic to the structure of the experience. The perceptual tendency towards good form, captured by the Law of Prägnanz in perceptual Gestalten, would be mirrored by the electrostatic tendency towards equilibrium in physical (neural) Gestalten. This doctrine of isomorphism, in its simplest form, claimed: "actual consciousness resembles in each case the real structural properties of the corresponding psycho-physical processes" (Köhler 1920, p. 38/193) .
I am mainly concerned here with the idea of a material Gestalt in its own right: it is a separate question whether this bit of Gestalt theory can be put to work in a naturalistic Gestalt psychology as Köhler suggested. I am concerned only with what material Gestalten were supposed to be, as characterized by HI and HE. With this sketched, I turn to the New Mechanists.
Mechanisms as Gestalten: HI
New Mechanistic accounts are heterogeneous, yet they all emphasize the importance of mechanistic organization. While it has been overlooked, New Mechanists' limited claims about organization either flirt with or explicitly commit to the view that mechanisms are material Gestalten which satisfy HI and HE. I discuss HI in this sub-section, and HE in the next.
Consider Glennan's initial definition and clarification:
(M) "A mechanism underlying a behavior is a complex system which produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts according to direct causal laws.
Notice that (M) is a definition of a 'mechanism underlying a behavior' rather than a mechanism simpliciter. One cannot even identify a mechanism without saying what it is that the mechanism does. The boundaries of the system, the division of it into parts, and the relevant modes of interaction between these parts depend upon what behavior we seek to explain" (Glennan 1996, p. 52 . If that is so, then plausibly-as Glennan seems to suggest in the tail-end of the passage above-the parts must likewise be understood not as "parts" simpliciter, but as as parts-of-a-whole-mechanism-for some behavior. This flirts with HI: the properties and interactions of parts that are genuinely relevant to the production of the behavior are features they exhibit only while in the organization of the whole mechanism. Take "the same parts" out of that organization, and whatever they might do, they contribute nothing to the production of the behavior: they are no longer parts-of-a-mechanism-for that behavior. One might resist this "quick route" to HI through Glennan's Law. Glennan seems to do so: "…to prevent (M) from being vacuous… the parts of a mechanism must have a kind of robustness and reality apart from their place within that mechanism. It should in principle be possible to take the part out of the mechanism and consider its properties in another context. Care must be taken so that parts are neither merely properties of the system as a whole nor artifacts of the descriptional vocabulary. I shall summarize these restrictions by saying that parts must be objects" (Glennan 1996, p. 53 ).
Yet this does not fully evade HI. To treat parts as "objects" in this sense requires only that they have some continued existence, and exhibit some stable properties, outside of the organization of a mechanism. This is consistent with the possibility that the parts may have other properties only within the organization of a mechanism, per HI. In what follows, I argue that mechanism parts are claimed to have just such holistically-individuated properties, and that these properties are central to the (ontic) New Mechanist's view.
The underlying issue concerns the extent of "decomposability" which is required of mechanisms, or the extent to which organization is permitted to condition parts' properties. Craver, and Bechtel and Richardson, appealed to the work of Wimsatt (1986 Wimsatt ( , 1997 to address this. Wimsatt articulated four conditions to characterize different varieties of aggregativity. Following Wimsatt, a system is a completely decomposable "mere aggregate" if it meets all four conditions:
1. Intersubstitutabilty of parts: rearranging and swapping parts doesn't influence the properties of the whole. 2. Qualitative similarity: the properties of the whole remain qualitatively similar (if quantitative, varying only in value) with addition or subtraction of parts. 3. Stability through decomposition and re-aggregation of parts: the properties of the whole remain invariant even if previously-independent parts are fused, and even if previously-linked parts are decoupled. 4. Minimal interactions among parts: there are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among parts which influence properties of the whole. 10 If a system is a mere aggregate, the specific organization of the parts contributes nothing significant to their features, or to features of the whole system: the whole is neatly decomposable into parts whose operations are self-determined. What Wimsatt calls a "mere aggregate" is quite clearly co-extensive with what the Gestaltists called an "and-summation." Where mere aggregativity (and-summation) is violated, HI is satisfied, and we have a material Gestalt. 11 According to New Mechanists, a mechanism is precisely not a mere aggregate. This commitment to HI appears in several ways in the literature. In an early work, Bechtel and Richardson (1993, pp. 26-32) claim that mechanistic explanation begins with fallible heuristics that presume that some degree of decomposability is possible, hence that the mechanism under investigation possesses some form of aggregativity. However, they endorse the view that (New) Mechanistic explanation does not require successful decomposition (ibid., cf. pp. 227ff.), and can be pursued where conditions 1-4 are violated (ibid., p. 26). Just to the extent that conditions 1-4 are violated, HI applies: the failure of decomposability arises because parts (or their properties) are individuated only when they occur in the right kind of whole.
Craver similarly holds that a mechanism is not just "literally the sum of its parts" (Craver 2007, p. 135 ; see also Glennan 2017, p. 23) . A mainstream mechanistic explanation of how a system ("S") exhibits a behavior (" -ing") proceeds by clarifying how it its parts ("Xs") exhibit some lesser behavior(s) (" -ing"), and how the behaviors of the parts contribute to the behavior of the whole. To provide any such explanation, we must reckon with the "active organization" of the parts, and must deny that they form a mere aggregate. The parts:
"…act and interact with one another in such a way that the -ing of S is more than just a sum of -properties. In fact, the -properties of a working mechanism are not just properties; they are the activities of and interactions among the entities in the working mechanism. The different components act in cooperation or competition, and they do so with some components and not with others. It matters which Xs with which others, and it matters how they interact. This is why the parts of mechanisms often cannot be reorganized randomly… added or subtracted at will… or taken apart and put back together again… without disturbing their corporate ability to " (Craver 2007, p. 136, my emph.) .
Notice: parts' -properties are not run-of-the-mill properties, and instead are only fully-individuated as such (they are what they are) only when parts are interacting within the organization of the whole mechanism, and working to produce its behavior. HI applies. Take "the same parts" out of that organization, or impede its working, and whatever you might learn, you will not observe the full set of parts' -properties, since these -properties arise only in the context of the whole, active organization. (Compare Glennan 2017, pp. 21-22 .) The interactions between parts renders mechanisms organized wholes rather than mere aggregates. As Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2009, 2013) put it, this is why parts cannot simply be studied in isolation, but must be recomposed to provide a complete explanation of how they produce the phenomenon of interest.
Commitment to HI is encoded again elsewhere. A key issue in the Mechanistic literature concerns which of the many "parts" that are spatially contained within a mechanism are working parts or "components" that genuinely contribute to occurrence of the explanandum phenomenon. Craver's account (revisited in Sect. 3 below) follows Salmon 12 in calling this the issue of "constitutive explanatory relevance." Craver offers what he calls the mutual manipulability criterion of constitutive relevance, and with it, a practical strategy for identifying working parts: "…a part is a [working] component in a mechanism if one can change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by intervening to change the component and one can change the behavior of the component by intervening to change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole" (2007, p. 141, original emph.).
The practical orientation here clearly hides ontological commitment to the coindividuation of working components and whole mechanism: the component, qua working component, is thus-and-so only when the whole mechanism is thus-and-so, and vice versa. That is why intervening to change one changes the other. So far as I can see, Glennan supports this same ontological commitment more recently:
If we characterize a mechanism as a thing S (entity or system) that is -ing, what counts as part of the mechanism's phenomenon (the -ing) depends upon what is actually contributing to the production of the phenomenon. Take for instance a car… While the car has many parts, not all parts contribute to its driving. The wheels matter but the rear-view mirror does not. Those parts of the car that are implicated in the mechanism are its working parts… A similar point may be made about the activities involved… The engine, for instance, is a working part of the car's mechanism for turning the wheels, but produces heat as it rotates the crankshaft. The rotation, but not the heat, is a working activity in the mechanism (2017, pp. 23-24, first two emphases added, last two in original).
And a similar point, we can add, should be made about the interactions between parts. The working interactions between parts are what constitute the mechanism's "active organization," in virtue of which some parts are working parts that jointly contribute to the production of the explanandum phenomenon. Other interactions are irrelevant (e.g., light might be reflected from the rear-view mirror onto the steering wheel).
In sum, Mechanists aim to explain the operation of a whole mechanism by appeal to the working components, their working activities, and their working interactions. These components, activities, and interactions are precisely the features targeted as relevant in a mechanistic explanation, and they are co-individuated with the whole: they are what they are only when the whole is what it is. Thus, HI applies to precisely those features of mechanisms' parts and activities which are most centrally relevant to (ontic) Mechanistic explanation.
Mechanisms as Gestalten: HE
The strategy of explanation New Mechanists have popularized is roughly the inverse of HE. Mechanistic explanation is construed as a decompositional or reductive 13 strategy which aims to show how the parts of the mechanism work together to produce a phenomenon exhibited by the whole (cf. Bechtel and Richardson 1993, p. 17; Machamer et al. 2000, p. 21; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, p. 425; Craver 2007, p. 133; Glennan 2017, p. 223) . In contrast, HE applied to mechanisms would be the claim that some properties of the parts are only explicable with reference to the whole mechanism. Clearly, for the purposes of mainstream Mechanistic explanation, HE is irrelevant. Yet, for other explanatory purposes, HE appears quite suitable. I offer an illustration.
A common example among New Mechanists is the mechanism of action potential generation in a neuron. A mainstream Mechanistic explanation of an action potential adverts to activities of the components: the joint operations of voltage-gated Na + and K + channels, etc. But suppose we ask (after an action potential occurs in an intact neuron): why was the Na + channel open? Ceteris paribus, an application of HE seems to provide a perfectly respectable answer: the Na + channel was open because the whole neuron was firing an action potential. This might seem trivial 14 but this holistic explanation is directly licensed by core commitments of ontic Mechanists. The ontic view roughly holds that, most fundamentally, explanations are things in the world that cause, constitute, or are otherwise responsible for the occurrence of some phenomenon. 15 In Sect. 2.3 above I argued that ontic Mechanists are committed to the claim that a whole mechanism's -ing is co-constitutive with the working parts' joint -ing: working parts only exhibit the full list of -activities when they work together to produce the phenomenon of interest. (Likewise: an electrical field attaining equilibrium is co-constituted with a certain charge being attained at each point in the field.) Now, if the phenomenon of interest is the whole mechanism's -ing, we can pursue a mainstream, ontic mechanistic explanation by locating the working parts and their -activites, which cause or constitute it. However, if the phenomenon of interest is some parts' -ing, and if that part's Φ-ing is co-constitutive with the whole's Ψ -ing, then the whole's -ing is equally well an ontic explanation of the part's -ing. Because "constitutive relevance is symmetrical in a way that etiological (that is, causal) relevance is not," the whole's behavior constitutes, or is otherwise (i.e., non-causally) responsible for-it is an ontic explanation of-the behavior of the part (Craver 2007, p. 153) . 16 This is not the sort of ontic explanation that ontic Mechanists have given pride of place, but it is nonetheless, by their own lights, an ontic explanation. 17 This is not a causal explanation, for all the usual reasons that constitution is not causation (cf. Craver 2007, pp. 153-154) . It is what Glennan calls a non-causal explanation, a "why-but-not-what-or-how explanation" (2017, pp. 223-224) . One who prefers causal explanations will likely find this application of HE unsatisfying. Of course, explanation need not stop here, and the New Mechanist is free to pursue their preferred explanation. I do not see that this diminishes holistic explanations of the sort just described. Mechanists should thus recognize HE as a route to legitimate variety of explanation, complementary to the "decompositional" route. 18 Since (ontic) Mechanists implicitly endorse HI and HE, and since these are the definitive features of Gestalten, I conclude that mechanisms (if they are real) are material Gestalten.
14 For clear (footstamping) accusations of triviality against this sort of explanation (simply because it is not decompositional) see e.g., Allport (1924) and Hamlyn (1951) . 15 I offer a more nuanced presentation of the ontic view elsewhere (Sheredos 2016) . 16 Fagan (2012 Fagan ( , p. 459, 2015 briefly considers that if constitution is symmetrical, it cannot account for the decompositional direction of mechanistic explanation: why shouldn't we also explain parts' behaviors by appeal to the whole mechanism's? Answer: we could. Accounts of (mainstream) mechanistic explanation have simply privileged decomposition. 17 The basic argument is quicker for the epistemic view. Suppose we have some understanding of an entity, but then come to understand it as a working part in a larger mechanism-for some phenomenon. Then we have increased our understanding, resulting in a net gain of epistemic explanatory power. Consistent with HE, "going up a level" can be, in its own way, explanatory (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005) . We might overlook the epistemic explanatory value of HE in cases where we begin from an understanding of the mechanism, and subsequently seek out its parts-but it is still there. 18 This increases mechanisms' explanatory import beyond decompositional how explanations.
One might worry that the applicability of the term "material Gestalten" to mechanisms is at best a bit of wordplay, trading on a "loose" conception of mechanistic organization. In this section I pursue two aims. First, I emphasize that the burden of providing an analysis of mechanisms' organization is widely recognized to rest squarely on the Mechanists' shoulders: if the identification of mechanisms as Gestalten is cause for alarm, the complaint should be lodged with the Mechanists who characterize mechanistic organization so "loosely," not me. Second, I examine a debate among Mechanists, showing there is no consensus on how to carry this burden. In Sect. 4 hereafter, I show that this debate was anticipated decades ago by Merleau-Ponty in his claims against the Gestaltists, and draw upon his work to diagnose the debate.
Craver's mutual manipulability criterion
One influential attempt to clarify mechanisms' organization was Craver's "mutual manipulability" criterion, introduced in Sect. 2.3 above. The criterion was explicitly offered as a novel adaptation of Woodward's (2002 Woodward's ( , 2003 manipulationist account of causal relevance, modified to address constitutive relevance. Woodward's account, roughly, is that we can say an item X is causally relevant to an item Y in conditions C if there is an ideal intervention on X in C (i.e., an intervention exclusively on X which neither affects any causal intermediaries between X and Y, nor directly effects Y) which would change the value of Y (compare Craver 2007, pp. 94-95) . Still more roughly: X is causally relevant to Y if wiggling X (alone) would wiggle Y. Craver utilizes this account to clarify the norms of causal explanation he discerns in neuroscientists' experimental practices (ibid., pp. 98-104).
Some distinctive experiments neuroscientists perform are what Craver (2007, p. 146ff.) calls interlevel experiments. Scientists are said to use these experiments to determine whether a part of a mechanism is a working part that is of constitutive relevance to the production of a whole mechanism's explanandum phenomenon (ibid., p. 144.). The inspiration for the mutual manipulability criterion comes from considering the practicalities of experimentation: "the close analogy between causal experiments [i.e., those performed to uncover causal relations] and interlevel experiments suggests that the manipulability account of etiological [or causal] relevance might provide a model for thinking about constitutive mechanistic relevance" (ibid., p. 152). Mutual manipulability, as we saw it in Sect. 2.3 above, relies on a bidirectional or symmetrical version of Woodward's account. In short, if X is a part of Y, and if wiggling X (alone) wiggles Y, and if wiggling Y (alone) wiggles X, then Craver suggests scientists have sufficient reason to conclude they are of constitutive relevance to each other. Conversely, where scientists demonstrate a lack of mutual manipulability, they have sufficient reason to conclude there is a lack of constitutive relevance (ibid., p. 159).
Mutual manipulability was offered as a "starting point" for understanding mechanistic organization (Craver 2007, p. 160 ). It has not proven to be a fixed starting point, and its merits are a subject of continued debate.
Organization, post-Craver
Here I review the ongoing debate regarding mechanisms' organization. While my remarks must be brief, I articulate positions in the debate in some detail: my aim in Sect. 4 below is to draw upon Merleau-Ponty to diagnose the real debate. Those familiar with the debate might skip to Sect. 3.3.
The debate over constitutive relevance can largely be understood as arising from a perceived tension between three claims 19 :
C1. Woodward's account of ideal interventions offers a suitable ontological analysis of the relation of causal relevance. 20 C2. Mutual manipulability (as sketched in Sect. 3.1 above) offers an ontological analysis of the relation of constitutive relevance, through an application of Woodward's account of causal relevance. C3. The constitutive relations between levels of a mechanism (e.g., working part and whole) are not causal (e.g., because they are synchronic).
If C1 and C2 are true, then constitution is a (bidirectional) causal relation, and C3 is false. If C1 and C3 impose constraints on an ontological analysis of constitutive relevance, then it seems C2 must be false. The debate concerns how to proceed from here. Some uphold C2, interpreting Craver's mutual manipulability criterion as an ontological analysis of mechanistic constitution (Leuridan 2011, §5; Fagan 2012, pp. 458-459; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015, §2.3; Gallagher 2018, p. 5) . Leuridan is alone in suggesting that to resolve the tension, we should abandon C3: so-called "constitutive" relations (per C2) turn out to be bidirectional causal relations (per C1) (2011, p. 424). On this view, the concept of causal relevance turns out to be ambiguous between "intralevel etiological relevance (or causal relevance sensu strictu) and interlevel relevance" (ibid., p. 424). Leuridan admits this does not fully resolve the ontology of constitutive relevance: "There is a difference between interlevel [i.e., constitutive] relations and bidirectional etiological relations [in general]… But my proposal makes clear that… as yet we lack the means to spell it out" (ibid., p. 424).
Others reject C2. On this view, Craver's appropriation of the formal apparatus of Woodward's interventionism does not provide an ontological analysis of what mechanistic constitution is, but rather only an epistemic criterion for when it is apt to believe a part is a working part (cf. Couch 2011, pp. 381-382; Fagan 2012, p. 459; Glennan 2017, p. 44) . 21 It is then an open problem to surpass C2, offering a genuine ontological analysis of constitutive relevance.
Most authors seek to surpass C2 while upholding C3, regarding the distinction between causal and constitutive relevance as non-negotiable. Romero suggested we set C1 aside, and do not understand interlevel experiments as involving Woodward's ideal interventions (2015, p. 3749) . Rather, interlevel experiments involve "fat-handed" (somewhat un-selective) manipulations: manipulating a working part simultaneously manipulates the whole, and manipulating the whole simultaneously manipulates at least one working part. This is to be expected if (as I have argued is true for ontic Mechanists) the two are regarded as co-constitutive. 22 Since fat-handed interventions produce simultaneous changes in part and whole, the relation between them is not considered causal, per C3 (ibid., p. 3747). Ultimately, despite these hints, Romero does not take himself to offer a full ontological analysis of constitutive relevance (ibid., pp. 3749-3750). Baumgartner and Casini (2017) have stepped into advance a thin ontological account: constitutive relevance is that relation between parts and whole in virtue of which they necessarily cannot be singly manipulated in ideal interventions, but instead only in fat-handed interventions that simultaneously affect both.
Krickel (2018) takes a different approach. Krickel regards the explanandum phenomenon as composed of a number of temporal parts, which occur as phases of a mechanism's prolonged activity. She maintains that some 23 of a mechanism's spatial and temporal moments are mutually manipulable: (1) some working part(s), working at t 1 , causally contributes to the production of a phase of the whole mechanism's activity at t 2 , such that ideally intervening on the former at t 1 would causally influence the latter at t 2 , and (2) this same phase of the whole mechanisms' activity causally contributes to changes in the same working part(s) at t 3 , such that ideally intervening on the former at t 2 would causally influence the latter at t 3 . The diachronic causal relations which underlie such mutual manipulability are distinct from synchronic constitution relations between part and whole (which, per C3, are not causal). It is then claimed that a whole mechanism and working-part are of constitutive relevance to each other iff the foregoing causal relations of mutual manipulability hold between them. 24 One final view is difficult to cast in terms of C1-C3. Fagan (2012 Fagan ( , 2015 has proposed understanding mechanistic organization on analogy with Bratman's (1992) analysis of social action. To borrow her illustration: you and I might each have an individual intention to walk, and might wind up walking in the same direction; or alternatively, we might have a shared intention, and might walk together in genuinely social action. "By analogy with the social action case, joint activities in biological contexts can be analyzed as follows:
(J) Components x 1 and x 2 jointly if and only if:
(1) x 1 has properties that mesh with those of x 2 and vice versa, (2) x 1 and x 2 form a complex x 1 x 2 in virtue of their meshing properties, (3) complex x 1 x 2 's and 22 Romero adopts a stronger claim of identity: "a mechanism's activity [i.e., the explanandum phenomenon] and its components arranged and working in the right way are the same physical event" (2015, p. 3746) . See fn. 12 above. 23 Krickel's account seems to uphold fat-handedness elsewhere. I do not see how one could alter some working part's working, at t 1 , without simultaneously altering the temporal part of the phenomenon occurring at t 1 (and vice versa) on her account. 24 Gallagher (2018) (4) uncomplexed x 1 and x 2 do not " (Fagan 2015, p. 75) .
The notion of "meshing" is meant to capture those features of components that enable them to work together. In the social case, this involves shared intentions. In purely biological contexts, "meshing" is a placeholder for a non-intentional something which can analogously unite entities to produce a joint activity of -ing-"the notion of meshing properties here needs further clarification, obviously" (ibid., p. 74). Glennan's recent account is similar: he suggests working parts have "affinities… capacities to 'seek out' and engage in interactions with other parts," and that "All mechanistic organization depends to some degree upon the existence of affinities-as parts must have capacities to interact with other parts" (2017, p. 121). Much of the work done by Glennan's concept of affinities is intuitive, invoking an analogy with social affinities between persons-note his scare-quoted use of intentional or anthropomorphic language. Fagan's formal apparatus looks like a step beyond an intuitive grasp on social action, but does not get very far. (J), applied to mechanisms, appears to be an alternative description of basic mechanistic organization: the constitutively relevant working parts of a mechanism are held to work together ("mesh") to constitute the mechanism's production of the explanandum phenomenon. This is "active organization" as described in Sect. 2.3 above. Fagan swaps the problem of constitutive relevance for the problem of analyzing "meshing properties," yet provides no analysis of them. The analogy to social action seems especially inapt as a starting point: what non-intentional feature of biological parts could be relevantly analogous to shared intentions? The envisioned ontological analysis would seem to be capable of succeeding only where it enforces a breakdown of the analogy offered to promote it. 25
The present debate, in sum
Let's take stock. The debate about constitutive relevance is largely a series of rival attempts to understand constitution non-causally. The debate was initiated by a reading of Craver (2007) as ontologically analyzing constitutive relevance as mutual manipulability (understood as bidirectional causation). Few endorse this view, and those who do admit it is not a full ontological analysis of constitutive relevance (Leuridan 2011) . Most pursue a non-causal analysis. 26 There is some tendency toward metaphors which do not seem to advance our understanding of mechanistic constitution (Fagan 2015; Glennan 2017) . Some analyses abandon the possibility of ideal interventions on parts and wholes, allowing only fat-handed interventions on working parts and wholes (Romero 2015) . This route might enable a thin ontological analysis of constitutive relevance as whatever necessitates fat-handedness (Baumgartner and Casini 2017) . If we get very fine-grained in our analysis, we might uphold mutual manipulability while also distinguishing causal relations from constitutive relations (Krickel 2018) .
As Kaiser and Krickel have summarized recently: "the notion of mechanistic constitution has gained increasing attention… But so far no approach has been developed that has found common acceptance" (2016, p. 746, fn. 3) . According to ontic Mechanists, we are ontologically committed to something (they do not agree what) called "constitutive relevance," and leading accounts of Mechanistic explanation must be supplemented (they do not agree how) to provide some account the ontology of mechanistic organization.
A Merleau-Pontian diagnosis
My aim is to show that Merleau-Ponty's claims about Gestalten anticipate and diagnose much of the debate just reviewed. I first (Sect. 4.1) introduce Merleau-Ponty's engagement with the Gestaltists, particularly in La Structure du comportement ("SC"). 27 I underscore that Merleau-Ponty's own arguments rely on premises that will likely not win wide acceptance, but (Sect. 4.2) I disentangle his core argument from these problematic premises. Finally (Sect. 4.3) I apply this argument against the (ontic) Mechanists, and offer a Merleau-Pontian diagnosis of the Mechanists' failure to reach consensus on an ontological analysis of constitutive relevance: there is no such analysis to be had.
Merleau-Ponty on Gestalt theory
Merleau-Ponty follows the Gestaltists in invoking the category of "form" or "structure" or "Gestalt" to oppose a classical conception of scientific realism, which viewed the world as ultimately composed of physicalistic, ontic "atoms." In the classical view, structure is not recognized: no wholes possess any distinctive features or capabilities that are not reducible to those of juxtaposed atoms, and each atom's capabilities depend only on its intrinsic properties. In short, the classical view did not recognize (let alone explain) phenomena of super-atomic order. A central example in Merleau-Ponty's treatment is the orderly character of intelligent behavior, which the classical view sought to explain through mere reflex-elicitations, understood in basically atomic fashion as "the action of a defined physical or chemical agent on a locally defined receptor which evokes a defined response by means of a defined pathway" (SC pp. 8-9/6-7). 28 A popular classical strategy for explaining apparently un-reflexive behavior was to divide the nervous system into a hierarchy, positing some reflex-like, automatic regulation (inhibition or control) of lesser reflexes. Merleau-Ponty is skeptical, for two related reasons.
First, Merleau-Ponty takes the neuroscientific data he reviews (which I omit) to suggest there is no dedicated, reflex-like "control circuit" which automatically regulates lesser reflexes. In his view, the concept of the reflex failed to describe the nervous system in the first attempt, since it could not account for orderly behavior. The classi-cal theorist then re-posited the reflex "further in," in the guise of an automatic control circuit. If this too fails, the classical theorist must again scramble to actually apply the concept which is intended to get their explanation off the ground. Merleau-Ponty remarks that this strategy will "have to be reinitiated indefinitely; and the solution will always be deferred, never furnished, until the moment when a principle which constitutes the order [un principe qui constitue l'ordre] instead of undergoing it has been introduced…" (SC p. 33/33) This latter claim helps us see the second, deeper reason why Merleau-Ponty thinks the classical view will not work. It is because a classical view simply cannot account for orderly phenomena (forms, structures, Gestalten). Order cannot be causally produced in the classical view: the output of any causal process will always just be, from the classical perspective, a new juxtaposition of atoms. As a result, the puzzle is not to find the right kind of regulation (inhibition, control, etc.) to cause order. Instead, as Merleau-Ponty phrases it: "the problem of order has no meaning if we make it a second problem of causality" (SC p. 50/53). Merleau-Ponty thinks we need no new kind or concept of causation in order to explain order: "causation" is not ambiguous, and has no secret sense we must work out. (Contrast Leuridan's claims, reviewed in Sect. 3.2 above.) 29 We must rather seek to understand a wholly novel, acausal co-dependency involved in the constitution of order (SC p. 154/167). I have not yet clarified Merleau-Ponty's argument against the Gestaltists, but can already indicate how he anticipates much of the dispute regarding mechanistic organization. The notion of "order" here is the sort of organization that distinguishes Gestalten from mere and-summations. As Merleau-Ponty sketches it: "what happens at each point is determined by what happens in all the others… this is the definition of order" (SC pp. 131/141-142). Just this sort of interdependence of working parts is what the New Mechanists have called mechanisms' "active organization" (Sect. 2.3 above). Merleau-Ponty's insistence that the constitution of order cannot be explained by (classical) causation anticipates the widespread insistence by Mechanists that constitutive relevance is not a causal relation (Sect. 3.2 above).
Meanwhile, Merleau-Ponty's criticism of the classical atomist anticipates other claims we've encountered. Both Fagan (2012 Fagan ( , 2015 and Glennan (2017) seem to endorse a decompositional approach to constitutive relevance, on which it is ultimately certain features that parts possess in isolation ("meshing properties" or "affinities") which underwrite relations of constitutive relevance. Merleau-Ponty clarifies a constraint on any such approach: it demands an ontologically rich conception of the parts, investing them with some principle which enables them to collectively constitute the order which is our explanandum. The classical view's limited ontological resources could not provide this. 29 I have argued elsewhere (Sheredos 2017 ) against confusion on this point in the secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty. A popular "enactivist" approach to Merleau-Ponty reads him as claiming that "a dynamical gestalt [is] composed of processes that unfold over time, and [is] characterized by recursive reciprocal causal relations" (Gallagher 2017 ). Krickel (2018) 's non-causal account of constitutive relevance has similarly been appropriated to clarify the enactivist's core thesis of "causal constitution" (Gallagher 2018) . By my lights, the causal-enactivist conception runs counter to both the aims of New Mechanists, and MerleauPonty's own view in SC.
We can draw further connections by considering one of Merleau-Ponty's central claims about the relationship between an organism's "reactions" and its surrounding world (milieu or "situation"). He understands these as two moments of the indivisible Gestalt which is perceived behavior. This bears emphasis: for Merleau-Ponty, an organism's behavior (as we perceive it) is not "a thing in-itself (en soi) which would exist, partes extra partes, in the nervous system or in the body; rather… behavior [is] an embodied dialectic which radiates over a milieu immanent to it" (SC p. 161/174). Both the organism and its milieu are "parts" of one whole perceived Gestalt: perceived behavior is not localized to a classical, physical body. The acting organism's body, in this sense, is not a classical juxtaposition of atoms, but rather an object of perception: what Merleau-Ponty calls a "phenomenal body" (SC p. 156/169) . With this in mind, consider the following claim:
"Situation and reaction are linked internally by their common participation in a structure… they cannot be placed one after the other as cause and effect: they are two moments of a circular process [d'un processus circulaire]… If behavior is a 'form,' one cannot even designate in it that which depends on each one of the internal and external conditions taken separately, since their variations will be expressed in the form by a global and indivisible effect" .
This claim about behavior is indicative of Merleau-Ponty's conception of all Gestalten. Any variation in the "parts" of a Gestalt is co-constitutive with an alteration of the whole form: each is co-individuated with the other. This anticipates the notion of "fat-handedness," and the claim that manipulating any working part of a mechanism (Gestalt) necessarily manipulates the whole (Sect. 3.2 above). Merleau-Ponty likewise insists these relations are not causal.
These connections, I hope, indicate how Merleau-Ponty's decades-old claims about Gestalten effectively summarize the basic "tension" (Sect. 3.2 above) which has driven the New Mechanists' debate over constitutive relevance. Merleau-Ponty's concern, like that of most New Mechanists, was how to understand the constitution of order or organization non-causally. Here his disagreement with the Gestaltists comes to the fore.
The Gestaltists reified material Gestalten, abandoning a classical atomistic ontology in favor of an ontology of Gestalten. This, in Merleau-Ponty's view, was an error: Gestalten were rather only to be understood as mind-dependent phenomena, experienced in perceptual consciousness. He offered several arguments for this view. One argument challenged the Gestaltists for failing to offer an adequate ontological analysis of material Gestalten: Köhler's (1920) discussion of physical (electrostatic) Gestalten was his target. In Merleau-Ponty's view, Köhler's reliance on intuitive metaphors was telling:
"That in the final analysis form [i.e., Gestalten] cannot be defined in terms of reality but in terms of knowledge, not as a thing of the physical world but as a perceived whole, is explicitly recognized by Koehler when he writes that the order in a form "rests… on the fact that each local event, one could almost say, 'dynamically knows' the others."* It is not an accident that, in order to express this presence of each moment to the other, Koehler comes up with the term 'knowledge.' A unity of this type can be found only in an object of knowledge… This unity is the unity of perceived objects." (SC pp. 143-144/155, footnoting Köhler 1920, p. 180 at the asterisk) Merleau-Ponty makes three claims:
M1. If this kind of anthropomorphic analogy is our best characterization of Gestalten, we lack an adequate, realistic, ontological analysis of them. M2. We are led to such analogies because we are (dimly, but correctly) implicitly regarding Gestalten as mind-dependent phenomena we experience in perceptual consciousness, because M3. the sort of unity which is imperfectly expressed by these anthropomorphic analogies is solely possessed by perceived wholes.
I take it most of us would grant M1. This is relevant to Fagan's (2015) conception of "jointness" on analogy with social action, and Glennan's (2017) claim that parts have "affinities" to "seek out" other parts (Sect. 3.2 above). These analogies are no substitute for an ontological analysis of constitutive relevance and mechanistic organization. M2 and M3 are more contentious, and they connect with Merleau-Ponty's second argument against the Gestaltists. Merleau-Ponty's view is that we do not discover material Gestalten in the advancement of science. We begin with an intuitive apprehension of perceptual-phenomenal Gestalten (e.g., a perception of a phenomenal body exhibiting behavior). Our perception of the phenomenon pre-dates our hardwon scientific understanding of it, and the whole purpose of scientific endeavor is to make the perceived world more precisely intelligible (SC p. 145/157). While we can come to understand a perceptual-phenomenal Gestalt more precisely through scientific research, we do not discover that entities in the mind-independent world are really, in themselves, material Gestalten. Scientific theories-e.g., laws of nature (SC p. 139/150) and mathematical formalisms (SC p. 143/155)-might have some applicability to perceived phenomena, enabling us to understand them more precisely, but neither licenses us in reifying Gestalten as mind-independent entities. Because the aim of scientific investigation is to make phenomena intelligible, Merleau-Ponty thinks it is incoherent to regard them as mind-independent things in themselves: a Gestalt should be regarded as an object of perception, not as an "element of the world" which exists independent of consciousness (SC p. 142/153) . This division between perceived phenomena and elements of the world is the root of Merleau-Ponty's claim M3, and this in turn supports his claim M2.
Many today will likely not uphold Merleau-Ponty's division between elements of the world and perceived phenomena. Moreover, many Mechanists would likely not readily agree that our starting-point for mechanistic explanation is perception at all: prototypical cases in the New Mechanistic literature are microscopic mechanisms and explanandum phenomena (e.g., within single cells). As a result, Merleau-Ponty's own arguments against material Gestalten will not win many adherents. However, I believe we can see our way to a plausible extension of Merleau-Ponty's argument.
The core of Merleau-Ponty's argument against the Gestaltists is that a scientific understanding of the world does not reveal any mind-independent entities in the world as having the organization of Gestalten. The Gestaltists had themselves sometimes implicitly admitted this. In his analysis of electrostatic Gestalten, Köhler was forced to admit that no mathematical formula on its own dictates that its intended referent is a material Gestalt: the quantitative apparatus omits the qualitative characteristics of Gestalten (SC p. 141/152). Köhler thus advocated devising some new mathematical sign which, appended to a given formula, would indicate that it should be given a qualitative interpretation as representing a material Gestalt Köhler (1920, p. 105) . The key issue here-the issue of whether and how our theoretical understanding of some system (e.g., as represented in a mathematical formula) might justify the reification of it as an organized whole-can be divorced from Merleau-Ponty's specific commitment to M2 and M3. In fact, a similar view has already been considered by some New Mechanists. Bechtel (2015) has argued that biological mechanisms (the mainstay of Mechanistic explanation) are typically "scale-free," meaning not only that there is no welldelineated temporal window in which activities occur, but also no well-delineated spatial region in which the mechanism can be said to exist. He proposes that the "mechanisms" (and their parts, and their activities) which are adverted to in a Mechanistic explanation should be viewed as idealizations, where idealization "involves the introduction of simplifying falsehoods"-e.g., the falsehood of discrete spatiotemporal boundaries (ibid., p. 85). A Mechanistic explanation can only be accurate to a "first approximation," and the idealizations involved always make it the case that the hypothesized mechanism "fails to give a fully correct account of the phenomenon occurring in nature" (ibid., p. 85). It is worth repeating Bechtel's take-home: "[T]he mechanisms proposed are posits of the scientists developing the explanation. They do not exist in nature as well delineated entities. The goal of mechanistic explanation is not to represent mechanisms as they exist independently of scientists. Rather, it is to show what phenomena, the parts and operations selected by the scientists, operating in the time-window they consider, can largely account for. While this may limit the aspirations of both scientists pursuing mechanistic explanations and philosophers characterizing their project, it does not challenge the value of pursuing [epistemic] mechanistic explanation and in the process idealizing mechanisms by delineating boundaries that do not exist in nature" (ibid., p. 86).
Clarifying Merleau-Ponty's core argument
Bechtel's is a robust epistemic approach to Mechanistic explanation. The aim of scientific explanation, on this view, is to make phenomena more precisely intelligible, and this need not require uncovering precisely the way the mind-independent world really is. The ontic approach to explanation, by contrast, maintains that epistemic explanation is parasitic upon identifying so-called "ontic explanations"-things in the world which cause, constitute, or are otherwise responsible for phenomena. The scalefreeness of mechanisms makes things difficult for the ontic camp: if we cannot identify the spatiotemporal location of mechanisms, it is difficult (a) to incur ontological com-mitment to them (to what, where, when, exactly, would we be committed?) and (b) to demand such ontological commitment as a prerequisite of epistemic explanation.
I suggest Merleau-Ponty's core argument against the Gestaltists proceeds along similar lines. Specifically, the theoretical division of perceived Gestalten into "parts" which may be to some extent understood in isolation (e.g., they can be represented using distinct variables in mathematical formulae) is an idealization, involving a falsehood of decomposability or aggregativity. This idealizing approach can offer a genuine increase in our understanding of the phenomenon, but it can offer no grounds for reifying organized, material Gestalten. (Again, here Köhler suggested appending some novel symbol to mathematical formulas, as if to say: "and this formalization represents a real, material Gestalt-though nothing in it shows it does.") Notice: Bechtel emphasizes idealizations regarding the spatiotemporal boundaries of alleged mechanisms, parts, and activities. Merleau-Ponty's argument, by contrast, emphasizes idealizations regarding the internal organization of alleged material Gestalten. Merleau-Ponty does not challenge the Gestaltist for failing to specify precisely where and when material Gestalten are held to exist. Rather, his argument concerns the problematic claim that a region of the mind-independent world (specify which region as determinately as you like) could be shown, through scientific investigation, to possess the holistic organization of a Gestalt.
We might disagree with Merleau-Ponty's claim that the starting point for scientific investigation is perception. This does not seem to diminish his main point against the Gestaltists: if Gestaltist science proceeds by analytically decomposing the very systems that (by their own lights) ought to be understood holistically, they labor under idealization. The idealized understanding they acquire grants no license to reify the organization of material Gestalten as an afterthought, since their decompositional strategy has done nothing to investigate it. If scientific investigation does not capture the holistic character of Gestalten's organization, then it cannot on its own incur ontological commitment to the mind-independent existence of such organization.
If the Gestaltists admit that the reason their analytical decompositions do not address organization is that they have presupposed from the outset that the system of study is an organized whole, then some story must be told about where that presupposition comes from. Merleau-Ponty's answer is perception, and his claim is precisely that the Gestaltists have misunderstood mind-dependent, perceptual-phenomenal Gestalten, and have mistakenly reified them as mind-independent material Gestalten (SC p. 144/156). Setting Merleau-Ponty's appeal to perception aside, the core problem is this: if Gestaltist science antecedently presupposes that some systems are organized wholes, they must admit that a scientific understanding of that system won through this presupposition cannot offer us a means to conclude that there exist material Gestalten at all.
Merleau-Ponty's implicit critique of the new mechanists
With all this in place, Merleau-Ponty's implicit critique of many New Mechanists is a straightforward application of his critique of the Gestaltists.
On the one hand, New Mechanists have been championing a decompositional style of explanation, which labors under the idealization (or heuristic) that mechanisms' parts can be studied in isolation. On the other hand, New Mechanists have sought to append an endorsement of holism (in their claims about mechanistic organization). These are not incompatible, but they are wholly disjoint: the decompositional strategy does nothing to clarify whence an endorsement of holism should arise. If we do endorse holism then, as I argued in Sect. 2, we might construe this as an ontological commitment to material Gestalten. Yet, as I reviewed in Sect. 3, no ontological analysis of mechanistic organization has attained consensus. At present, many New Mechanists are promoting ontological commitment to certain holistic, organizational features of mechanisms, when (a) leading accounts of Mechanistic explanation offer us little to understand those features, and (b) little has been said to even enable us to identify the features to which ontological commitment is encouraged. Mechanists cannot simply reify organization as an afterthought. If (mainstream) Mechanistic explanation offers only an idealized understanding of ontic structures called mechanisms that does not capture the alleged, holistic character of their organization, then it simply cannot incur ontological commitment to the mind-independent existence of such mechanistic organization.
Again: this line of argument is distinct from Bechtel's. A targeted response to Bechtel's challenge might secure ontological commitment to juxtaposed mechanismbits in a bounded spatiotemporal region of the world. It might not, on its own, respond to Merleau-Ponty's challenge, securing commitment to any special relations of organization (e.g., "constitutive relevance," "active organization") within that region.
If Mechanists admit that their (or, mechanistic scientists') decompositional explanations do not address mechanistic organization because they have presupposed from the outset that mechanisms are to be understood as organized wholes, then some story must be told-by mechanists-about where that presupposition comes from. Minimally, Mechanists must admit that mechanistic science does not itself offer us a means to conclude that there exist mind-independent, organized mechanisms. 30 Future work might resolve these issues, yet caution is suggested by the wide variety of approaches toward constitutive relevance that have appeared in the short time since it became a focus of inquiry. Understanding Merleau-Ponty's critique of the Gestaltists suggests a conservative position: until such time as a suitable ontological analysis of constitutive relevance is offered which addresses these concerns, it is more modest (involves fewer ontological commitments) to suppose that mechanisms, qua organized unities, need not really exist in themselves, in a mind-independent nature. Mechanistic explanation, as an epistemic strategy, instead begins from a working assumption that mechanisms are to be theoretically constructed as organized wholes. 31 30 Knee-jerk cries for an "inference to the best explanation" are misplaced here. A candidate ontological analysis of mechanistic organization must be specified before any such inference to the world can be made. We have no clear candidate: our best accounts of mechanistic explanation offer none, and there is no consensus regarding the many possible candidates that have been offered as an afterthought. 31 Obviously, a robust epistemic strategy incurs no commitment to HI, construed as a claim about metaphysical individuation. Regarding HE, see fn. 17 above.
It is simply not required to attach ontological commitment to this working assumption, nor need the assumption be discharged by some empirical demonstration that there exist ontic structures called mechanisms that, in themselves, possess some distinctive style of organization. The assumption does its work by specifying in advance some constraints on how we seek to understand phenomena when we pursue the project of Mechanistic explanation. 32 On this view, the debate over constitutive relevance amounts to some first forays into elaborating a framework for how we might make mechanisms' (presupposed) organization more precisely intelligible. Whether or not such a framework is successfully clarified, our pre-scientific apprehension of mechanistic organization will always pre-date our idealized scientific understanding of it.
